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Peterson: The Federal Enclave Problem: A Case Note on United States v. Miss

THE FEDERAL ENCLAVE PROBLEM: A CASE
NOTE ON UNITED STATES v. MISSISSIPPI
TAX COMMISSION

Bruce Peterson*

United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 41 U.S.L.W. 4774
(U.S. June 4, 1973) resulted in the failure of the Mississippi Tax Commission getting a man on base in the first of what may go as a threegame series.
The Facts. In 1966 the State of Mississippi passed a local option
law, thus repealing the former "dry" status of the state. The Mississippi
law vested the Tax Commission as the exclusive wholesalers of all alcoholic beverages within the state, "including, at the discretion of the
Commission, any retail distributors operating within any military post
. . .within the boundaries of the State. . . ."I The Tax Commission
was also given authority to add to the cost of such beverages an amount
equal to cover the cost of operations of the state wholesale liquor business, to make it competitive with surrounding states, and render a profit.
The Tax Commission marked up distilled spirits 17 per cent and wines
20 per cent.
Prior to 1966, officers' clubs, post exchanges and ships stores purchased their liquor direct from distillers located outside of the state.
Following repeal of Mississippi's prohibition these nonappropriated fund
activities were permitted the option of either purchasing liquor from the
Mississippi State Tax Commission, or direct from the distiller; but in
either event the state markup was imposed. These nonappropriated
fund activities continued to purchase direct from the out-of-state distiller, who in turn added the markup to the cost of the liquor. To this
the Government protested, but such protest fell on deaf ears in the Tax
* Professor of Law, College of Law, The University of Tulsa; B.., LL.B. University of Oklahoma; LL.M. New York University.
This article previously appeared in THE ARMY LAWYER, DA Pamphlet 27-50-13,
January, 1974. Reprinted by permission of the Judge Advocate General's School.
1. Miss. Code Ann. § 10265 et seq. (Cam. Supp. 1972).
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Commission. Then the Government sought to pay the markup into an
escrow fund pending judicial determination of the legality of the markup.
This arrangement was of no avail, and the nonappropriated funds continued to pay the markup under protest. Finally, in November, 1969,
the United States sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against the collection of the markup by the Tax Commission from the
out-of-state distillers and for reimbursements of the amounts paid under
protest for the period 1966-1969. Four United States military installations were involved: Keesler Air Force Base and the Naval Construction
Battalion Center, over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction; and two installations over which concurrent jurisdiction existed
by both the United States and the State of Mississippi, Columbus Air
Force Base and the Meridian Naval Air Station.
How the Lines Were Drawn. The Government in its brief, both
at the district court and Supreme Court level, argued that as to the two
bases over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction,
article I, section 8, clauses 14 and 17 of the United States Constitution
prohibited state regulation without the express consent of Congress.
As to the two concurrent jurisdiction installations, the Government contended that the markup constituted an unconstitutional tax on a federal
instrumentality' interfering with federal procurement regulations and
policy established by the Department of Defense.3 Mississippi, on the
other hand, placed all their eggs in one basket and relied solely on the
twenty-first amendment to the Constitution. The second section of the
twenty-first amendment reads as follows:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.
The three-judge district court bought the rationale of the Tax
Commission and held that the markup was not an unconstitutional foray
into the federal domain. 4 The district court took a rather novel approach as to the two bases over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction. This was necessary in order to avoid prior Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court in Collins v. Yosemite
Park Co.5 held that the twenty-first amendment did not grant Califor2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
3. 32 C.F.R. § 261.4(c).
4. United States v. State Tax Commission of the State of Mississippi, 340 F. Supp.
903 (S.D. Miss. 1972).

5. 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
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nia power to prevent the shipment of liquor into and through her territory destined for distribution and consumption in a national park over
which the government exercised exclusive jurisdiction. The Court said
that this traffic did not involve "transportation into California 'for
delivery or use therein!" within the meaning of the amendment. This
ruling was later characterized by the Court as holding "that shipment
through a state is not transportation or importation into the state within
the meaning of the Amendment."
Faced with these decisions the three-judge federal district court
found that neither Keesler Air Force Base nor the Naval Construction
Battalion Center, the exclusive jurisdiction installations, had promulgated any regulations concerning the transportation of liquor purchased on the reservations into the State of Mississippi; and in fact that
patrons authorized to purchase from the beverage stores did transport
the liquor into the state and consume it there. Thus, the district court
held, Collins was not applicable as delivery and use was restricted to
the park in that case.7 As to the two installations, Columbus Air Force
Base and Meridian Naval Air Station, over which the United States
and the State of Mississippi exercised concurrent jurisdiction, the district court relied on Supreme Court decisions involving state minimum
price laws. In one of these cases Penn Dairies Inc. v. Milk Control
Comm. of Pennsylvania" minimum prices were placed on the sale of
milk by dealers under the Pennsylvania Milk Control Act. Renewal
of one dealer's license was denied because he sold milk in violation
of the minimum price pursuant to a contract with the United States
for milk to be consumed by troops stationed at a camp situated on land
belonging to the State of Pennsylvania and over which there had been
no surrender of state jurisdiction or authority. The Supreme Court
held that the statute was applicable with respect to these sales and the
state could properly enforce its policy by denying the dealer a renewal
of its license. The state law did not conflict with the legislation of
Congress requiring competitive bidding in the purchase of supplies for
the Army. Superimposed on this decision were subsequent pronouncements by the Supreme Court that hardly clarified a hitherto murky
area. In a near companion case with Penn Dairies, the Supreme Court
6. Carter v.Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944), Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321
U.S. 383 (1944), affg 137 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1943). Comments, 72 HARv. L. REV.
1145 (1959), 27 N.Y.U.L. Rv.127 (1952).
7. Supra note 4 at 907.
8. Penn Dairies Inc. v. Milk Control Comm. of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261
(1943).
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held that a state cannot apply its regulations fixing a minimum price
for milk sales consummated on an Army base which was subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.'
In 1963 the Supreme Court, in Paul v. United States,'0 held that
the State of California could not enforce its law fixing a minimum price
on the sale of milk at wholesale with respect to milk sold to the United
States at military installations for strictly military consumption and for
resale at federal commissaries. The enforcement of such a minimum
price law was found to conflict with the provisions of federal law
regulating the procurement of all basic provisions by the armed services
where appropriations of federal funds were involved. The statutes required competitive bidding and the awarding of the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder. The Court distinguished Penn Dairies holding that subsequent to this decision there had been a comprehensive
revision of the laws governing procurement of supplies and services by
the War and Navy Departments. However, the Court did hold in Paul
that purchases by the United States of milk for resale at military clubs
and post exchanges-purchases not made out of appropriated funds
and hence not controlled by federal procurement policy-were subject to minimum price laws in effect when the United States acquired
the land for a military installation.
The district court, pinning its hopes on the second section of the
twenty-first amendment, sent their progeny on to Washington, D.C. via
certiorari without probing the other two issues raised by the Government, i.e., whether the markup constituted a tax on a federal instrumentality immune from taxation or was in conflict with the federal procurement regulations and policy, and thus in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
In the Halls of the Supreme Court. Hampered by the narrowness of the lower court's opinion, the Court held that the twenty-first
amendment did not cut as wide a swath as the district court envisioned.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the exclusive jurisdiction federal enclave problem has not always been necessarily consistent."1 The Court's
opinion in the instant case centered around two facets: first the scope
of the twenty-first amendment, and second the status of the federal enclave over which the Government exercised exclusive jurisdiction.
As to the first point, the Court reiterated the rule that the twenty9. Pacific Coast Dairies v. Dept. of Agriculture of Calif., 318 U.S. 285 (1943).
10. 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
11. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
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first amendment conferred something greater than the conventional state
police power as to the importation of liquor destined for use, distribution or consumption within the borders of a state.' 2 Thus the limitations otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause are simply not present
where intoxicants are destined for use, distribution, or consumption within the state.' 3 Following the rationale of the Collins case, 4 the Supreme
Court concluded that shipment of liquor from an out-of-state wholesaler
to a military installation over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction did not give rise to a nexus or event vesting the state
with regulatory jurisdiction. The Court pointed out that the markup
was not directed toward regulation of the use, consumption or disposition of liquor within the State of Mississippi, to which the second section of the twenty-first amendment is directed, but rather runs afoul
of the provisions of article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution
regarding the exclusive federal legislation with respect to such territory.
As to the two concurrent jurisdiction military facilities, the scope
of article I, section 8, clause 17 was found inapplicable. Interestingly
enough, at the Supreme Court level the State of Mississippi asserted the
view that the markup was for all intents and purposes a sales tax, and
that Section 105(a) of -the Buck Act' 5 consented to the imposition of
such a tax on the sale by wholesalers to the federal instrumentality. In
reversing and remanding the case to the district court, the Supreme
Court specifically directed the lower court to explore the parameters
of the Buck Act, and specifically Section 197(a) that deals with various
exceptions to the consent provisions. Section 107(a) states that the
general consent provisions of the Act "shall not be deemed to authorize
the levy or collection of any tax on or from the United States or any
instrumentality thereof. ..

."

What on Remand? In this next series it is possible that the Mississippi Tax Commission may get a man on two bases-and it is remotely
possible that they may get a man on all four bases. The second issue
that the district court is going to have to look into is that of the possi12. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1972); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966).
13. On questions tried under the Commerce Clause and the twenty-first amendment
with respect to the power of the state to control the transportation of liquor through and
out of their respective jurisdictions, see Ziffren v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
14. Supra note 5.
15. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-10.
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bility of a conflict regarding the markup and the federal procurement
regulations and policy. In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined in by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, the impact of the Buck Act is emphasized and Justice Douglas points out that, even viewing the markup
in the worst possible light, as a sales tax, the legal incidence of this tax
is not on an instrumentality of the United States, but rather on the wholesaler. The dissenting opinion appears to have taken the view that officers' clubs, ship stores, and post exchanges are in fact federal instrumentalities. This squares with a 1942 Supreme Court decision. 6
The district court has some interesting options. First, as to the two
exclusive jurisdiction bases, the Supreme Court has precluded the use
of the twenty-first amendment on which to bottom the markup. Should
the district court determine the markup not to be a tax on the wholesaler allowed by the Buck Act, then the Tax Commission strikes out
twice. But should the court determine the markup to be a sales tax, then
it's a new ball game. They must then turn their attention to Section
107(a) of the Buck Act and ascertain whether the markup is removed
from the consent provisions of Section 105 (a). Even should this come
to pass, a final hurdle remains with the lower court's determination of
whether or not the markup provisions are in conflict with federal procurement regulations and policies. 17 The lower court looked into this
aspect of the case in the first instance, but reached no definitive conclusions.
As to the two concurrent jurisdiction enclaves, the district court
must ignore the twenty-first amendment, as the Mississippi scheme is
not designed to prevent the illegal diversion of liquor into the state, but
is couched rather undeniably in revenue measure terms. The safest
successful approach for Mississippi would be through Sections 105(a)
and 107 (a) of the Buck Act if the markup is deemed by the lower court
to be a tax on the sale by the wholesalers to the federal instrumentality.
Even if no sales tax is found, such a markup would presumably still be
constitutional as legitimate state regulation-subject then only to a
finding that such practice did not conflict with federal procurement
regulations or policies.
Assuming that the lower court should find that the markup does
16. Standard Oil Co. v. Calif., 316 U.S. 481 (1942), held that a U.S. Army post
exchange was to be regarded as a federal instrumentality for the purpose of a California
law which exempted from the state gasoline sales tax "sales to the government of the
United States or any department thereof for official use of said government."
17. 50 U.S.C. App. § 473. The Secretary of Defense implemented this statute
by issuing Department of Defense Directive 1330.15, (32 C.F.R. § 261.1-261.5).
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not constitute a tax within the meaning of the Buck Act, thus precluding the markup on installations over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction, but authorizing such regulation as to concurrent
jurisdiction installations, it could result in a knot of truly Gordian proportions.' 8 Many of the larger military installations are comprised of
both exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction land. Location of housing,
clubs and bars then might be of major importance, insofar as state
regulation is concerned.
18. The Commission of Intergovernmental Relations: A Report to the President
(June, 1955), 237. For an excellent analysis of the enclave problems, see Note, 101 U.

PA. L. REv. 124 (1952).
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